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PINNING GULLIVER DOWN: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL CASE STUDY ON THE
PLACE OF DECENTRALIZED POWER IN
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DOCTRINE
COLIN CRAWFORD *
INTRODUCTION

However, in my thoughts I could not sufficiently wonder at the intrepidity of these diminutive mortals, who durst venture to mount and
walk upon my body, while one of my hands was at liberty, without
trembling at the very sight of so prodigious a creature as I must appear
to them.'
ULLIVER'S reflections upon meeting his Lilliputian captors offers
a particularly suggestive image for Americans who perceive an urgent need to begin rethinking - and reshaping - the contours of Amencan administrative law and its far-reaching influence in our lives. Indeed,
the American administrative behemoth has grown so large, unwieldy,
and controlling that it has come to resemble Gulliver untied among the
Lilliputians.
Bound by the Lilliputians, Gulliver confessed that he "was often
tempted, while they were passing backwards and forwards on my body,
to seize forty or fifty of the first that came in my reach, and dash them to
the ground." 2 The discussion that follows assumes that the American
legal and social structure routinely permits an administrative Gulliver to
act on its impulses, and that the consequence of this situation is fundamentally undemocratic. A central purpose of this Article, therefore, is to
indicate, at both a theoretical and doctrinal level, how to allow for an
increased popular voice in the admimstrative process. To put it more
prosaically, this Article asks how to start tying Gulliver down.
The strong sentiment for citizen democracy which contributed to the
creation of our republic is now widely recognized. 3 But, unlike Gulliver,
who came by chance among the Lilliputians, the administrative law system is our own collective invention. Gulliver longed to be untied because
he desired his liberty 4 By contrast, it is our liberty that is consistently
commandeered by the administrative law system. If one assumes that

G

* Instructor in Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School; M.A.
1984, Cambridge University; B.A. 1980, Columbia University.
1. JONATHAN SwiFr, GULLIVER's TRAVELS 24 (1954).

2. Id. at 23.
3. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,

1776-1787, 226-37 (1969) (identifying arguments that a centralized power should exist in
conjunction with democratic government).
4. SwIFr, supra note 1, at 24.
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the governed should be actively involved in the process of governing, it is
worth investigating ways in which the administrative law system can be
restrained or directed to act for the people and to explore the possibilities
of renewed democratic governance.
The argument of this Article proceeds on several fronts. First, using
the example of transport of hazardous materials, and, occasionally, more
general issues surrounding regulation of toxic substances, this Article
will document the absence of a local voice in federal administrative law '
Because of the dangers involved in the use of hazardous materials, they
present a particularly troubling example of the risks and possible consequences involved in neglecting local initiatives. The analysis used here
applies with force to most fields of administrative law, to everything from
health and safety regulation and maintenance of police forces to highway
location and the provision of public housing.
Second, the Article identifies the underlying assumptions which make
possible this conspiracy of indifference to notions of decentralized power
in administrative law This is a plea for the virtues of inconsistency as
against the often-muttered truisms about the regulatory value of consistency and uniformity 6 The case of hazardous materials starkly illustrates the necessity of engaging in decentralizing reform of administrative
law and turning to local, broadly participatory forms of admimstrative
control. Given the time it can take to remedy faulty federal administrative procedures and decisions, local procedural experimentation seems a
promising means to help prevent the possibility of future environmental
disasters - or worse. Endorsing a speculation of Richard B. Stewart, "[i]t
may be persuasively argued that the ideal of a unitary theory of administrative law is untenable and is likely to distract us from the world's complexity and hinder the development of inventive solutions to the variety
of problems that confront us." 7
Third, this Articles's examination of periodical literature on admimstrative law in the Umted States exposes the limited vision of the legal
academic establishment with regard to the possibilities for decentralized
admimstrative power. Fourth, the Article explores speculative, more
idealistic proposals for localities desiring legal recognition of their administrative voices, in addition to proposing practical short-term solutions by
5. "Local" cannot be defined with precision in this context. "Local" sometimes
means "state," as used here and in National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d
819 (Ist Cir. 1979), although states are sometimes the allies of federal regulators against
municipalities and other local interests. Board of Comm'rs v. Nuclear Assurance Corp.,
588 F Supp. 856 (N.D. Ohio 1984). Thus, although "local" most often will define a city
or municipality, it need not. The larger organizing concept is a desire to put into practice
the principle of self-determination at some level of popular government.
6. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) ("What is
crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by
erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.").
7. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REv 1667, 1807 (1975).
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which localities can begin to correct their relative administrative disempowerment. Finally, the Article concludes that for these proposals to
be effective there needs to be flexibility m implementing these solutions.
I.

THEORETICAL CLAIMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A
DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REGIME

Conceptually, three theoretical claims buttress the argument that the
administrative state must be re-oriented to allow greater citizen participation. The first is a perception that the desire to achieve regulatory
uniformity and consistency is all too often at the core of federal administrative law and tends to stifle alternative notions of social action and arrangement. That is, in a desire for doctrinal tidiness, the law often
sacrifices possibilities for enriching our individual and collective lives.
Roberto Margabeira Unger argues that the "indeterminate fund of potentialities" suggests the folly of seeking uniform application of a single
administrative law system:
the indeterminate fund of potentialities in which the individual as
an abstract self participates is never just a mirror image of the species
nature. The separateness of persons would be shallow were it not the
case that each person represents in a limited and distinctive fashion the
possibilities open to the entire species
The species nature advances through the development of the capacities
of individuals. But no definable set of realized individual talents exhausts human nature, which is continuously changing in history. The
universal good exists solely m particular goods, yet it is always capable
of transcending them. The two aspects of the good are inseparable.8
In thinking about admimstrative law doctrine, dependence on federal
doctrine stifles individual potentialities and capacities; just as no one can
display the species nature in Ins life, neither can a single doctrinal system
adequately reflect the range of effective responses to social problems.
Tolerance of different responses to administrative problems could, therefore, only benefit a nation struggling adequately to cope with difficult and
complicated issues like responsible management of hazardous waste
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal. In practical terms, this
Article proposes that one obvious way that Americans will be closer to
realizing "the possibilities open to the entire species" is by tolerating
more ideas and plans for administration and rulemaking.
The second theoretical claim is that a critical examination of the role
of bureaucratic structures in our lives is of vital importance.9 Following
Unger's warning, a "utopian socialist" vision must take bureaucracy senouslyi ° if a nation is to pursue successfully the task of achieving in8. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 240 (1975).

9. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1277 (1984).
10. See Unger, supra note 8, at 251. See also STEVEN LUKES, Alienation andAnomie,
In PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY at 134-56 (Peter Lalett & WG Runciman eds.
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creased public participation in government."1 At a general level, this
claim questions one of the central assumptions fueling federal admmistrative law, namely that newer or bigger or more productive technologies
routinely provide the most satisfactory means of ordering our lives."2
More specifically, this questioning requires an analysis of the direction of
legal energies - those of judges, regulators and other bureaucratic officials, litigators, legal scholars and others - in the service of large-scale
bureaucratic organizations when given the opportunity to assist people in
efforts to improve their situations at the local level. 3
The third and final theoretical claim claim on which the argument depends is a belief that democracy, in the active, literal sense of that term,
is invigorating and socially enriching.14 In this context, the work of several thinkers is useful. Unger again provides a helpful point of departure.
In an effort to accurately define the phenomenon of "domination" in society, Unger considers a number of its manifestations, particularly the
1978) (examining the extent of our desires as social beings to conform to rules and bureaucratic structures in modem industrial society).
11. Since local concerns are consistently excluded from the doctrine of administrative
law, this suggestion challenges some of the "rhetorical devices employed to assure us that
bureaucratic organization can be consistent with human freedom." Frug, supra note 9, at
1293.
12. See, e.g., Judge Higginbotham's declaration that:
The transport and storage of 'hazardous materials' has generated increasing
concern over the unpredictable risks presented to the public, while at the same
time, it is recognized that our modem society depends upon the transformation
of atomic power into energy and the ready availability of these fissionable
materials for industrial, commercial and consumer use.
Higginbotham ends these comments with the odd conclusion that this dilemma "has led
to rigorous federal, state and local regulation in the nuclear energy field." The conclusion
is odd insofar as he proceeds to find a local ordinance preempted by federal law, negating
the possibility for local action in such matters. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1104 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986).
See contra SAMUEL BOWLES ET AL., BEYOND THE WASTE LAND: A DEMOCRATIC
ALTERNATIVE TO ECONOMIC DECLINE 137 (1983) [hereinafter BOWLES GROUP] (on the
need to challenge the "logic of profitability").
13. Admittedly, this is an ambitious aim, perhaps hugely so. The presumption is that
the resistance to local decisionmaking when there exists the alternative of resolution by a
larger bureaucratic decisionmaker is profound, as for example the Second Circuit's endorsement of Department of Transportion regulations for transporting hazardous substances, notwithstanding fears and local concerns about the statistical dangers posed by
hazardous materials. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 1055 (1984), revrg 539 F Supp. 1237, in which
Judge Sofaer focused, inter alia, on the worries of the New York City population with
transport of radioactive materials in a densely populated conurbation. The circuit court
approved a situation in which safety precautions were left to regulators alone. For example, the circuit court approvingly cited this Department of Transportation (DOT) position: "[d]evelopment of the current DOT proposal [for transport of hazardous materials]
reflects existing arrangements between DOT and [the Nuclear Regulatory Commission]
" 715 F.2d at 750. At the district court level, this relegation of authority to federal
agencies alone was exactly the sort of statement which seemed to trouble Judge Sofaer,
who noted DOT's "skepticism of the capacity of localities to adopt rules worthy of national, or even regional, respect." 539 F Supp. at 1249.
14. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984).
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attempt to resolve the "quandary of dominance and commumty."15 For
Unger, a key aspect of the tension between these two notions is to identify "the range of social life that should be taken into account m deter' 16
mining the worth of shared ends as signs of man's species nature."
This emphasis on the communal aspects of our social experience finds an
echo, at a more practical level, m the work of the Bowles Group. A
concern for easing the tension between authority and community is seen,
for example, in their insistence upon "sustained popular mobilization for
a democratic workplace." 7 The centerpiece of their plan for industrial
and economic recovery is, therefore, increased "worker commitment" by
virtue of increased worker self-governance on a firm-by-firm basis. As
the Bowles Group persistently argues, the result is likely to be increased
productivity 18 Importantly, for the Bowles Group, "productivity" is not
narrowly defined in terms of capital goods, work hour inputs and similar
"purely" economic factors. That is, in Unger's terms, "social life" is defined by the Bowles Group by a wide range of factors, constituted of our
shared values and ends as well as by our material needs. Indeed, their
"social model of productivity" is flexible and democratically responsive.19 For example, they would admit, as "social gains," demands "for
greater worker safety and health, for better consumer protection, for a
pollution-free environment, [and] for less disruption of commumties"
into a productivity calculation despite the costs of such measures to revenue-making outputs."0 Similarly, the Bowles Group advances an economic bill of rights m order to establish "popular control over
investment priorities,"2 1 by means such as public control of banks and
insurance companies at a community level.22
The thinking of the Bowles Group is precisely the sort of theorizing
which could beneficially be applied to the decentralizing reform of administrative law The reworking of the admimstrative law system to effect expressions of commuity self-government is an ideal route for
beginning to implement the kinds of democratic projects urged by them.
The case law examined in these essays demonstrates that, at least since
the early 1970's, citizen groups have turned to federal regulators for recognition of their local concerns.
A world more disposed to think like the Bowles Group, for instance,
the Township of Lacey, New Jersey, which passed a 1985 ordinance
prohibiting importation of spent nuclear waste for storage, would prove a
more formidable opponent of courts and regulators. In Jersey Central
15. See UNGER, supra note 8, at 244-46.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See UNGER, supra note 8, at 244. See also id. at 64-67.
BOWLEs GROUP, supra note 12, at 4.
Id. at 122-78.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 323-51.
Id. at 331.
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Power & Light v. Township of Lacey,2 3 the court struck down the ordinance, distinguishing a similar California case on the grounds that the
California statute had an "avowedly economic purpose" and so was not
preempted by federal law 24
The worldview of the Bowles Group would raise other concerns, matters of personal health and safety, for instance, as subjects equally entitled to administrative attention. This is not to dismiss the significance of
"avowedly economic" factors, but to insist that they be considered alongside a wide range of human concerns. This is to question, in the context
of regulating hazardous substances, the wisdom of a musing like this:
[s]ure, we could avoid a lot of environmental problems by giving everybody 40 acres and a mule again. We can live on a level with nature
alright. But we as consumers demand plastics, and newsprint with colors in the ink, and nylon stockings. We demand
all sorts of things
25
from industry and we'll pay a price for 'em.
A subsidiary aim of this Article is then to propose that the federalist
character of administrative law doctrine permits a facile endorsement of
views like that quoted above, views which on popular reflection might be
amended considerably, and in any case merit public debate. That is, if
people are encouraged to derive their own solutions to problems like the
transport and storage of hazardous wastes, they might opt to use fewer
plastics or to read newspapers in black and white.

II.

THE LiLLIPUTIANS TRY TO TAKE CHARGE

A.

Efforts to Enlarge the Significance of Choice

Like the Bowles Group, Michael J. Piore and Charles F Sabel provide
an analysis of industrial society with the goal of imagining alternative
ways of organizing American social and political life.2 6 Drawing upon
empirical research, they record their favorable impressions of individuals' adaptability and mobility in the workplace and the capacity of workers to perform both at a more productive and a more personally
satisfying level when given the opportunity to seek out suitable skills and
23. 772 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986).
24. Id. at 1112 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983)). Concurring in part in Pacific Gas, Justice
Blackmun expressed reservation with the Court's opinion "to the extent it suggests that a
State may not prohibit the construction of nuclear power plants if the State is motivated
by concerns about the safety of such plants." Id. at 223; cf. id. at 229.
25. Dick Russell, Passingthe Buck Burningthe Evidence, IN THESE TiMES, Mar. 1622, 1988, at 11 (quoting Arkansas State Representative Mike Wilson, also a member of
the "first family" of the pesticide-polluted town of Jacksonville, Arkansas). See also Liane Clorfene Casten, Agent Orange'sForgotten Victims, THE NATION, Nov. 4, 1991, at
550 (detailing some of the medical problems besetting residents of Jacksonville, Arkansas
in the wake of plans to commence incineration of toxic wastes there).
26. MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE,
17, 251-308 (1984).
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crafts.2 7 Their endorsement of the socially transformative possibilities of
variety, in industrial organizations, the workplace, and the community,
offers a model of action for the adminstrative law reformer. Moreover,
such a decentralized approach is ideally suited to correct imbalances in
the structure of an industrial society that, on close examination, turns
out to be socially and economically segmented and discontinuous.2"
The logical extension of this suggestion is continued in Berger and Piore's further instruction to the social critic. Specifically, they caution
that the differences between two segments of a society are not necessarily
"less significant and less durable than the similarities. 2 9 In terms of the
legal effort to secure more democratic, decentralized units of administration, the import of this reasoning in an area like the transport of hazardous waste is to stress the need to explore local solutions to the dilemmas
posed by the side effects of sophisticated modern technologies. If the
composition of our society is indeed "discontinuous and segmented," citizen engagement in government and the systematic recognition of popular views expressed at the local level present obvious means by which to
begin responding to heretofore neglected social segments. The suggestion here is that in view of the various "segments" composing our social
order, it is necessary to expand the number of forums through which a
social segment can commumcate its desires for change.
In other words, society needs to aim for solutions to the reform of
administrative law, and not for a solution.3" In the language of Berger
and Piore, "[iun order to release both imagination and will from the constraints of false necessity" in search of "a vision of the diverse possibilities that can be realized within industrial societies."3 1 Potentially, the
benefits of such flexibility and adaptability or of a willingness to experiment with the contours of admimstrative regulations are vast. In theory,
decentralizing regulations could alter government priorities and lead to a
redistribution of resources from projects in areas such as the proposed
testing of biological weapons,32 the burial of nuclear waste33 or the testing of AIDS drugs.3 4 Indeed, the urgency of the issues adverted to here
may force such administrative flexibility to become a practical necessity.
Of course, it is easy to mouth the rhetoric of decentralized, grass-roots
power. Critics of decentralization are likely to ask what a more localized
27. Id., at 5-9.
28. SUZANNE BERGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, DUALISM AND DISCONTINUITY IN IN-

DUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 2 (1980).

29. Id. at 9.
30. Cf Stewart, supra note 7.
31. BERGER & PIORE, supra note 28.
32. John H. Cushman, Jr., Army Rethinks Planfor a Utah Test Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1988, at A14 (Utah residents dispute federal plans to locate test site).
33. Keith Schneider, U.S. Scales Back Planfor Burialof Atomic Waste, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1988, at Al (New Mexico residents oppose citing of nuclear waste repository).
34. See Gina Kolata, Doctors and Patients Take AIDS Drug Trial into their own
Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1988, at C3 (local testing of drugs to fight the fatal virus
undertaken where federal drug approval practice is extremely protracted).
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system of regulation would look like. In this regard, two qualifications
are worth mentioning. First, since the task is to embrace variegation as a
central tool of admimstrative reform, it would contradict the spirit of
decentralizing regulation as envisaged here to specify the precise shape of
the administrative future; 35 second, however, one record of local mitiative in combating centralized federal administrative domination is preserved in the case law At the very least, the local efforts documented
there present a log of experiments in democratic self-rule which can be
drawn upon in the process of rethinking American administrative law. It
is, therefore, appropriate to examine that record.
B.

The Failure of Local Efforts to Regulate Hazardous Wastes

From the viewpoint of cities, towns, unincorporated townships and
even states, the recent history of local attempts at self-regulation in the
area of hazardous waste transport is largely a story of failure. On the
basis of the judicial record concerning this and related issues, the inhibiting effect of the administrative law system upon democratic participation is profound. Consider the example of Jacksonville, Arkansas.
Jacksonville has been the site of pesticide production since 1948. In the
decade after 1961, twenty percent of the herbicide Agent Orange was
manufactured there. Since 1979, E.P.A. studies have shown unacceptably high levels of dioxin in Jacksonville's soil and water.36
A dilatory campaign by state and federal officials to clear the site had
been unsuccessful. This effort was largely conducted in the courts, where
federal and state authorities have been seeking to have the manufacturer
pay its own cleanup costs. 37 Simultaneously, federal and state authorities
undertook to incinerate on-site hazardous materials. Fearing that this
untested procedure would release yet more dioxin into the environment,
Jacksonville citizens geared into action. Their response took two forms.
First, the Jacksonville City Council passed an ordinance disallowing incineration of the waste. Second, the town's residents passed a referen35. Cf Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a FederalSystem, 19 URB. LAw. 553,
564-68 (1987) (In order to obtain autonomy, cities must agree among themselves rather
than cede power to federal agencies.).
36. See Liane C. Casten, While the E.P.A. Fiddles: A Town is being Poisoned, THE
NATION, Mar. 19, 1988.
In residential areas adjacent to the [chemical manufacture] site, soil samples
contain as much dioxin
as 111 parts per million (p.p.m.) and 200 parts per
billion (p.p.b.). That's 200 times more concentrated than the dioxin levels in
Times Beach, Missouri, which the E.P.A. ordered evacuated. The agency has
said I p.p.b. of dioxin is a danger to humans.
Id. at 370.
37. The E.P.A. took action at Love Canal and Times Beach reluctantly, only
after reports of death and damage had become too persistent to ignore. In Jacksonville, the E.P.A. approach is to go to the courts
Reluctant to spend the
Superfund millions required to decontaminate [the sites], the E.P.A.'s enforcement branch has waited in vain for [the manufacturer] to do its own
housekeeping.
Id. at 372. See also IN THESE TIMES, supra note 25.
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dum against incineration.38
Yet if legal doctrine and recent experience are any guide, the residents
of Jacksonville will see their efforts to prohibit the incineration overturned by higher powers, by people who are unlikely to live in Jacksonville.3 9 In contravention of their desires, they can expect federal (or
state) law to defeat their wishes about how to handle an already disastrous situation, typically by the use of several techniques. They might
see their democratic initiatives halted by the use of the preemption doctrne4 by the invocation of a variety of standard constitutional arguments, notably commerce clause and supremacy claims,4 1 and even the
suggestion that localities m and through which hazardous wastes are
stored and transported lack standing to challenge federal regulations
38. See IN THESE TIMES, supra note 25.
39. Indeed, as this article goes to press, this is the unfortunate denouement of Jacksonville's incineration dispute. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, In Arkansas Toxic Waste
Cleanup, Highlights of New EnvironmentalDebate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1992, at B11

(Although Governor [and now President-elect] Clinton recently gave final approval to:
burn the chemical wastes in an incinerator in what would be the largest cleanup
ever undertaken in the United States
even as the burning began, a Federal
district judge in nearby Batesville took control of the program and ordered the
incineration stopped on Nov. 10 to give scientists time to review the results of
safety tests.
Id. The article further notes that "the project has become typical of toxic waste cleanups
around the country in which the costs escalate amid interminable delays caused by Federal rules aimed at gaining public trust."); Keith Schneider, Judge to Oversee Burning in
Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at A16 (reporting that Federal District Judge Stephen M. Reasoner had ordered incineration to cease until Nov. 9-10); Scott Bronstein, Is
Clinton Cleaner, Greener Than Bush, Arkansas Group Balks as Sierrans Back Governor,
THE ATLANTA CONSTUTION, Nov. 2, 1992, at A8 (Clinton "[s]upported burning di-

oxin contaminated wastes at an abandoned herbicide factory in Jacksonville, where three
contaminated Superfund sites have more than 28,000 leaking barrels of toxic wastes.");
Paul Kemezis, Dow Settles Dioxin Lawsuit, CHEMICAL WEEK, Aug. 22, 1990, at 16 (Dow
Chemical settled with 102 workers at the Vertac site who claimed, inter alia, that Dow
officials knew of the chemical dangers at the site as early as 1965.)
Separately, Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton (D) has announced that he will not try
to stop incineration of dioxin waste at the Vertac site in Jacksonville
[EPA's] plan to destroy the waste on-site later this year is strongly opposed by
many community members, who have demanded that the state step in to block
it.
Id., see also CHEMICAL WEEK, Jan. 22, 1992, at 13 ("Vertac Site Contractors (Jacksonville, AR) has received "dioxin certification" from the Arkansas Department of Pollution
Control and Ecology for its Jacksonville hazardous waste incinerator, allowing it to process contaminated materials, some of which contain dioxin.").
40. See Board of Comm'rs v. Nuclear Assurance Corp., 588 F Supp. 856 (N.D. Ohio
1984); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986); Fossella v. Dinkins, 494 N.Y.S.2d 878 (2d
Dept. 1985), aff'd, 485 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1985); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. City of
Dover, 450 F Supp. 966 (D. Del. 1978).
41. See National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1979);
Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 518 F Supp.
928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982); Browning-Ferns, Inc. v.
Anne Arundel County, 438 A.2d 269 (Md. 1981); South Dakota Dep't of Pub. Safety v.

Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786 (S.D. 1983).
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under the "case or controversy" requirements of Article III.42
To be sure, localities have on occasion avoided the fate of those referred to above. If, for example, Jacksonville frames its response to federal and state preemption arguments on particularly narrow grounds43 or
responds in such a way that federal law is found not to provide a clearcut
answer, 44 the initiative to prevent incineration of the pesticide wastes
may succeed. But this best case scenario depends upon luck, exceptional
legal ingenuity, or a combination of both. If Jacksonville residents do
not manage to propose such precisely focused, narrowly responsive arguments, they are likely to share the discouraging fates of the residents of
Ridgefield, Connecticut, Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, and the states of New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Dakota
and Washington, as described in the cases adverted to above.
The record compiled by these and similar cases attests to the fact that
democratic initiatives run an obstacle course of arguments when endeavoring to introduce local views into the administrative process. In cases of
hazardous material transport and storage, the language and logic employed by courts reviewing administrative action or regulation suggests
that almost any argument will do so long as it quiets expressions of local
discontent. A few examples illustrate the degree to which the notion of
federalism both molds interpretation of admimstrative law and also conveys something of the ingenuity expended in sustaining the command of
federal doctrine over the business of regulation. Washington State Building and Construction Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Spellman4 5 considered
a state initiative to prohibit storage of nonmedical radioactive waste generated outside of Washington. The threat to federal nuclear waste "disposal" 46 efforts was undoubtedly serious. In 1980, Washington State
42. Borough of Ridgefield v. New York Susquehana &Western R.R., 810 F.2d 57 (3d
Cir. 1987).
43. E.g., National Tank Truck Carriers Inc. v. City of New York, 677 F.2d 270 (2d
Cir. 1982); City of New York v. Ritter Transp. Inc., 515 F Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 677 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1982) (City Fire Department regulations limiting transport
of hazardous gases held not preempted by federal law). It is worth remarking that these
cases followed a dangerous gas spill on the George Washington Bridge. One unfortunate
consequence of the present impoverishment of local power in administrative law is that
the interpretation of administrative doctrine is often a matter of correcting a bad situation
after the fact. By contrast, most of the cases discussed in this essay tell the story of
prospective local efforts. Of course, in the case of hazardous wastes, other kinds of pollutants, highway location or even racial quotas in federally subsidized housing projects,
retrospective solutions are often woefully late. This would be the case if a disaster occurred following the local efforts described in the cases that follow.
44. E.g., Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F Supp. 1193, 1224 (E.D.
Cal. 1978) (where boxcars containing hazardous materials exploded, state has the power
to impose tort remedies since applicable federal statute did not do so).
45. 518 F Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981).
46. As pointed out by Judge Bazelon, Natural Resources Defense Council v. United
States Nuclear Energy Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 647 n.41 (1976), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 964 (1978) [hereinafter NRDC v. USNEC], "waste disposal" is "a misnomer
for what is more appropriately termed "waste storage and management," for the "con-
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stored 27% of America's total radioactive waste. 47 Recognizing this
fact, the court concluded that "[i]f the Initiative were permitted to stand
it would aggravate an already critical situation., 4 8 The court's conclusion is indisputable. However, since regulatory interpretation of local
effort tends to perceive aggravation of a situation as undesirable and requiring diffusion rather than as an opportunity to force discussion of
political choices, the court held for the plaintiffs, using constitutional
arguments.
Conceivably, this kind of "aggravation" was part of what the citizens
of Washington State intended when they voted for the referendum. Curiously, the court justified this finding on the grounds that the Referendum
Initiative did "not regulate evenhandedly," 4 9 although it said nothing
about the uneven burden of radioactive storage among states. In dicta
indicating the court's ambivalence on the implications of its holding, it
added that defendants failed to prove the threat to health and safety from
radioactive waste, and that "the State's safety interest, assuming proper
compliance with adequate regulation, is at least arguably illusory." 5
The court's ambivalent language is quite striking, given its firm repudiation of the choice made by the people of Washington State. The court's
failure to explore its own ambivalence is suggested, moreover, by its acquiescence to federal decisionmaking. Because the Initiative "significantly impairs the federal interest in encouraging the peaceful use of
radioactive material and in solving the radioactive waste problem,""1 it
was struck down in an opimon in which the court seems needlessly defensive, reaching for every possible reason to justify its position. It is,
after all, difficult to overcome federal preemption analysis. The coupling
of the "peaceful use" of radioactive material with the waste storage problem therefore appears to be overly defensive. Indeed, from a purely legal
point of view, this policymaking language is irrelevant and unnecessary
Given the court's apparent discomfort, logic would ask why the doctrine cannot be bent to accommodate the views of people who live under
the shadow of a regulatory action. That is, should not the affected citizenry be permitted more actively to balance the federal government's desire for expanded "peaceful uses" of radioactive material against the local
problems raised by the waste such usage generates?
Similarly, in the Jersey CentralPower & Light cases, 52 the court containment of wastes during the long periods [viz. eons] necessary for them to decay naturally into non-toxic substances."
47. Spellman, 518 F Supp. at 931.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 935. As in most of these cases, the court interprets "safety" quite narrowly.
For example, the psychological impact of such storage is seldom entertained as part of a
"safety" calculus.
51. Id.
52. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. New Jersey, 772 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1985) (dispute over the transport route for radioactive waste); Jersey Cent. Power & Light v. Town-

58

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT

[Vol. IV

sidered a series of actions arising out of a controversial shipping campaign of radioactive wastes from January 3 to July 9, 1985. By the time
of decision, the shipping campaign had ended, raising significant mootness problems. The court dismissed two of the three actions in light of
the campaign's conclusion, finding the Turnpike Authority's claims that
transport of radioactive materials along its routes was unlikely to persist
"merely because the Turnpike is traversed as a general matter,"5 3 and
questioning the assertion that the state would have a continuing interest
in designating a Turnpike route for transport of radioactive waste.5"
The court's holding against the state agencies is also remarkable insofar as both the New Jersey Department of Transportation and State Police authorities, presumably experienced with the routes in question (and
two of the agencies that would be forced to respond to any accident),
advocated the use of an alternate, although non-NRC approved, route.5 5
In short, the court's arguments were based on speculation about local
practices which looked, not so much to the layout of state roads or residential and industrial use patterns, but to its preference for federal administrative control. The court proceeded, however, to entertain one
action among the Jersey Central Power cases. The case concerned the
smallest governmental unit involved in the controversy, namely the
Township of Lacey By comparison to its dismissal of the other claims
on the grounds that they presented factual situations unlikely to be repeated, the court averred that "the constitutionality of the challenged
ordinances and the degree of local authority to be retained by municipalities with respect to the regulation of nuclear reactors within their midst,
give rise to vital legal issues of substantive merit despite the fact that
JCP&L has completed its shipping campaign., 5 6 Although this was not
the sole justification for the court's finding of an open "case or controversy" under Article III, it is noteworthy that the municipality's interest
animated the court's desire to forestall future challenges where the issue
of continued state involvement in the shipment of radioactive waste did
not. 57 It seems reasonable to speculate, therefore, that the court was motivated to a significant degree by a fear of similar local ordinances. The
ship of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103 (3d Cir. 1985) (township ordinance prohibiting importation
of nuclear waste challenged); New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light,
772 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1985) (conditions for transport of radioactive waste on state turnpike contested) [hereinafter the Jersey Central Power cases].
53. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 772 F.2d at 34.
54. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 772 F.2d at 39-42.
55. Id. at 38.
56. Jersey Cent. Power & Light v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir.
1985).
57. However, the court acknowledged that the mootness issue was a close one in all
three cases, justifying its lengthy opinion in the state case despite the finding of mootness
in anticipation of possible review on appeal. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d at 41.
This does not, however, mitigate the force of my analysis to the effect that the local action
may have raised the most "vital issues of substantive merit" because it was seen most to
challenge the integrity of the status quo.
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court's response is typical of administrative rigidity when faced by local
undertakings; by contrast, the state authorities were better integrated
into the admimstrative process and their relations with the NRC for ratesetting purposes well established.
Why such apprehension? At their best, such local, democratic endeavors might be seen as a source of experimentation with solutions to perplexing social concerns. Indeed, the courts in Spellman and the Jersey
Central Power cases might have taken instruction from Judge Bazelon
who, in a related context over fifteen years ago, endorsed the view that
"the problems involved are not merely technical, but involve basic philosophical issues concerning man's ability to make commitments which
will require stable social structures for unprecedented periods." 8 Alternately, they could have drawn from Judge Sofaer's related recognition to
this effect:
Public reaction is a manifestation of collective wisdom based on
human experience. It should not be lightly dismissed as unscientific.
But even if public fear were based purely on faith (or the lack of it),
fear has real consequences, which are costs that must be analyzed and
included in determining whether the proposed action will have a significant impact on the environment. Public anxiety disrupts social and
political priorities, diverting the attention of public officials and courts
from other necessary activities.59
These perspectives take seriously public concerns about the transport and
storage of hazardous materials. They are also both drawn from opinions
that on balance favored local interests and that were overturned on appeal. Since then, however, the estimates of the likelihood of "worst-case"
scenarios involving the use of hazardous substances have only increased.60 Consequently, these expressions of support for public action
appear to be increasingly warranted.
Yet the tendency of agency action and that of the courts interpreting
agency procedures is to downplay, if not entirely to disregard, the relevance of local concern. Inattention to local sentiment is typically justified by invoking doctrines and arguments in support of three central
positions. The first such argument contends that localities or local citizens' groups are not the interests administrative regulations are designed
to protect. By this logic, localities are too small; administrative agencies
58. NRDC v. USNEC, 547 F.2d at 652.
59. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 539 F Supp. 1237, 1274; cf.
Kris Cameron Ramey, Note, City of New York v. United States Departmentof Transportation: Urban Radioactive Waste Transportation Gets Another Green Light, 7 J.ENERGY
L. & POL'Y 177, 186 (1986) (on inattention to "human concerns" in DOT rulemaking
procedures).
60. Id. at 182. See also Todd Wallace, Comment, Preemption of Local Laws by the
HazardousMaterials TransportationAct, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 654, n.1 (1986) (discussing
the alarming statistic that nearly one drum of hazardous material is lost for every three
truckloads which take to the nation's roads); cf Bradley M. Marten, Regulation of the
Transportation of HazardousMaterials: A Critique and a Proposal, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 345, 345-47 (1981) (containing similar statistics).
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must answer to larger constituencies. The second position is one of retreat to legalistic deference to agency expertise and statutorily derived
authority, as if individuals have no expertise about the damages facing
them in their daily lives or should have no authority over their inmediate environment. The third and final position, the argument to which
nearly every defender of federal (or state) regulatory authority ultimately
has recourse, and a notion which overlaps both of the first two positions,
is the claim for consistent and uniform application of the law 61
These arguments characteristically invoke the rhetoric of democratic
fairness and participation. However, as demonstrated in the cases discussed below, the reality is that the arguments tend instead to forsake the
possibility of actual democracy m favor of protecting the position of the
federal administrative bureaucracy It is, therefore, the unnecessarily
anti-democratic consequences of the doctrines used to buttress federal
admimstrative dominance that must now be examined.
C.

The Aftermath of Vermont Yankee: Whose Interest Should be
Made Public?

The exclusion of local interests from matters involving hazardous substances is widespread but has perhaps been given no more resounding
expression than by then Justice Rehnquist m the culmination of the Vermont Yankee litigation.6" Vermont Yankee involved contested rulemaking procedures for the licensing of a nuclear power plant. At issue was
the Licensing Board's alleged refusal to consider relevant environmental
issues.63 Speaking for a unanimous Court," Rehnquist delivered a
sternly worded disquisition on the importance of respecting agency authority to fashion its own procedures, 65 arguing for the integrity of
agency procedures following state or Congressional delegations of authority 66 To this end, Rehnquist inveighed against "unjustified obstructiomsm" of agency proceedings,6 7 by which he apparently meant
intervention into the licensing procedure by public interest groups.68
61. This third category is akin to the "formal equality" offered to justify pluralist
interest group models of politics, as identified by Frug, supra note 9, at 1372-77.
62. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1977), rev'g, Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Reg'y Comm'n,
547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and NRDC v. USNEC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
63. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 531 n.10.
64. Id. at 521 (Justices Blackmun and Powell did not take part in the decision).
65. Id. at 543-44.
66. Id. at 558. Rehnquist's invocation of state power in this context is disingenuous
inasmuch as twenty-four states urged affirmance. Id. at 522-23; cf Richard B. Stewart,
Vermont Yankee and the Evolution ofAdministrative Procedure,91 HARV L. REv 1804,
1809 n.19 (1978).
67. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553-54.
68. Commentators on this issue often use inverted commas when referring to "public
interest" groups, as if to question their representatives. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart &
Cass R. Sunstem, Public Programsand PrivateRights, 95 HARV. L. Rv. 1193, 1218-19
n.100 (1982); Neil K. Komesar, Lawyenng Versus ContinuingRelations in the Administrative Setting, 1985 Wis. L. REv 751, 754 (1985). Although this is undoubtedly an
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The intervening public groups in the Vermont Yankee litigation urged
the "colorable alternative" of energy conservation. Energy conservation
was arguably an alternative to construction of the nuclear facility, which,
it was hoped, would meet the "threshold test" for judging the comprehensiveness of agency procedures.6 9 This alternative could be raised,
however, only after the licensing proceedings had already begun, due to a
Court of Appeals decision handed down contemporaneously with the licensing proceedings requiring consideration of environmental issues.70
Despite this procedural impediment to the opposition of citizen groups,
the Court proceeded to dismiss the energy conservation alternative on
the grounds that it had not been sufficiently considered and constituted
but "a single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, urged by parties
who never fully cooperated or indeed raised the issue below ...
For the advocate of citizen participation with the goal of constraining
the administrative Gulliver, the evident paradox here is that the issue
was "peripheral" and not fully considered below because it could not be
raised until a late stage in the licensing proceedings. In other words, the
Court's interpretation forces the citizen intervenors into the catch-22 of
unavoidably having done too little and too late.
Regrettably, this move carefully to squeeze the demos out of agency
action has subsequently been formalized in other ways. For instance, in
Borough of Ridgefield v. New York Susquehanna & Western Railroad,7 2
the third circuit affirmed the view that there is no private right of action
available under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA).7 3
The action involved the claim by two contiguous incorporated towns that
the handling of liquid butane within their borders was unsafe, in violation of the HMTA. For the purposes of the HMTA, the circuit court
observed, the municipalities in question were private parties, members of
the "public at large." 7 4 This was true despite the collective, corporate
character of local governments.7 5
Consider the opposite scenario. If the towns passed an ordinance
important question in a society espousing egalitarian principles, it is hardly surprising
given the doctrinal resistance to expressions of local feeling that citizen groups, however
unrepresentative of the population at large, should seek a route of expression for some
form of the "public interest" Thus, to refer skeptically to the "public interest" may
confuse cause and effect, failing to ask why this form of democratic participation occurs.
See also Stewart, supra note 7, at 1766-71, where he questions the public accountability of
public interest lawyers.
69. Aeschliman, 547 F.2d at 628-29, rev'd, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 511 (1978).
70. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 531-32 n.10.
71. Id. at 558.
72. 810 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1987).
73. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1992).
74. Borough of Ridgefield, 810 F.2d at 60 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 690-92 n.13 (1979)). See also Clark v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 944 F.2d 196,
197 (4th Cir. 1991).
75. Cf Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980)
(on the disabling consequences for municipalities of the pubic/private distinction).
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against the railroads for improper handling of hazardous materials and
the railroads sued to declare the ordinances invalid, they would presumably have been found to have standing to sue under the HMTA.7 6 By
contrast, in Borough of Ridgefield, the court interpreted the HMTA's
injunction that it was designed "to protect the Nation" 7 as an indication
that "Congress has not enacted a statute 'with an unmistakable focus on
[a] benefitted class' but instead has framed the HMTA as a general command to a federal agency
. All residents of the United States are the
HMTA's intended beneficiaries." 7 8 Again, the court's support of administrative process appears to be circular. The HMTA exists to protect all
Americans, but it is unlikely that all Americans will rise up and assert
"our" interest on behalf of the Borough of Ridgefield. The administrative decision therefore reverts to the federal authority, which in theory
will act on our behalf. Expressions of local interest are thus neatly set
aside. The HMTA's aims to protect our health and safety might more
fully be served if local anxiety were allowed to be balanced against interstate commercial considerations. It then would become hard to explain
why federal regulators are in a better position to carry out the statute's
general command than those affected by the statute on a daily basis.
As a result, one can speculate with some confidence that the Borough
of Ridgefield courts shared some of the fears of their peers interpreting
Spellman and the Jersey Central Power cases. The Borough of Ridgefield
cases evidence similar apprehensions that permitting such actions would
unleash a wave of democratic intervention in the admimstrative process.
If the aim is to minmize public dispute over already hotly contested matters, this is unmistakably a wise course. But the Borough of Ridgefield
decisions also raise the issue of where and at what level of government
decisions affecting local lives and surroundings should be made. Should
the people of Ridgefield be precluded from having a say in administering
the way in which hazardous waste is handled by private carriers in
transit through their borders?79 One hypothesis advanced in this Article
is that the answer as to what level of government should regulate activities need not be the same with respect to every issue and situation. At
the very minimum, however, what is suggested here is that localities
should be placed on an even footing with the branches of state and federal government to decide how, when and to what extent local regulatory
initiatives are to be respected.
Board of Comm'r v. Nuclear Assurance Corp.80 presents an analogous
76. This is usually achieved by invoking 49 U.S.C. § 1811, which allows for preemption in the event of an inconsistent non-federal state or local "requirement" The broadness of the term "requirement" is a testament to the possible reach of federal control in
this area.
77. 49 U.S.C. § 1801.
78. Borough of Ridgefield, 810 F.2d at 59 (citation omitted).
79. See Frug, supra note 75, at 1144-46 (examining arguments for securing legal
rights by virtue of geographic ties instead of large property interests).
80. 588 F Supp. 856 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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situation. In that case, the court demed plaintiff's request for declara-

tory and injunctive relief to prevent shipment of spent nuclear fuel
through Cuyahoga County until local safety forces were adequately

trained to respond to an accident involving radioactive material. Notably, the Cuyahoga County municipalities banded together in seeking this
relief, not only against the public utility shipper of the waste, but also

against the State of Ohio and Wisconsin Electrical, Oluo having agreed
to Wisconsin Electrical's shipment of spent fuel through Cuyahoga
County

81

The Cuyahoga towns' show of solidarity was rejected by the court.
The court's holding against them illustrates the present incompatibility
between administrative law doctrine and notions of decentralized power.
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Article
III, reasoning that the likelihood of a nuclear transportation disaster was
so small as to render "the injury of unpreparedness to be too speculative
and remote to support standing. '82 One of the "minimal and crucial
elements of standing" used to evaluate the plaintiff's claim was the test
that plaintiff "personally suffered some actual or threatened injury."' 3
The harms identified by the plaintiffs included fear and anxiety caused
by unpreparedness to assist in a disaster and the assertion of economic
loss from having to support training of their own safety forces in the
eventuality of a nuclear accident. The court was unpersuaded. Dismissing the town's suggestion that it was forced to carry a double burden
(the social/psychological and the economic) as the result of decisions executed by larger governmental authorities, the court reasoned that local
safety forces were under no compulsion to deal with accidents on the
Ohio State Turnpike (the road in question). With this argument, the
court made a doctrinal move typical in such situations, rejecting a higher
standard of care in an especially volatile area of social policymakmg in
order to protect the integrity of federal administrative interests. This is
paradoxical, as noted below, since the usual fear of state and local government power was that smaller units of authority would observe too low
a standard of care.
Ignoring the fatal possibilities of a radioactive transport accident, the
court disposed of the municipalities' position with a formalistic separation of powers argument. It nearly goes without saying that in the event
of an accident, the delegation of authority would become quite insignificant. It is also disquieting in the area of hazardous materials transport to
observe the imposition of a requirement of "actual or threatened injury,"
81. Id. at 858.
82. Id. at 860 (relying on the tripartite standing argument established in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
83. Id. at 859. It should be acknowledged that the facts of this case are not perfectly
supportive of my argument in that, as noted by the court, the County did not exhaust
every possible means to protect its citizens from the eventuality of an accident. Nonetheless, it is worth asking why they felt so disempowered and/or fearful as to bypass other
theoretical possibilities and bring the suit in the first place.
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defined as the occurrence of an accident and nothing less. It understates
the realities of this situation to note that this is an undemocratic, if not an
anti-democratic way to articulate social policy, when democracy is taken
to mean government by people where they live. This is to say nothing of
the judicially-rejected but continuing, harder-to-measure impact of widespread public anxiety about the transport of hazardous waste.
It is further troubling to compare the decision in Nuclear Assurance
Corp. with National Tank Truck Carrers,Inc. v. City of New York. 4 In
National Tank Truck the Second Circuit affirmed the district court finding that local fire regulations prohibiting the unauthorized transport of
propane gases were not preempted by the purpose of federal regulations
"to protect against risks to life and property from the transportation of
hazardous materials." 8 5 As a victory of local sentiment in the federal
regulatory process, this decision is to be celebrated. But by comparison
to Nuclear Assurance Corp., this case reveals a disturbing difference in
the facts. Specifically, the incident which gave rise to the National Tank
Truck litigation was a gas leak by defendant's truck on the George
Washington Bridge, presenting a condition of significant danger where
"[i]t was necessary to clear the bridge, and block all traffic from using it.
The incident lasted for nearly eight hours. There was a long delay in
remedying the leak because of [the defendant's] inadequate emergency
equipment." 8 6 The likelihood of human error and any number of contingencies conceivable in a hazardous substances transport accident, an
eventuality made real by the illustration of National Tank Truck, suggests that the highest possible prospective standard of care deserves sustained consideration. This is what the plaintiffs in Nuclear Assurance
Corp. endeavored to achieve. At the very least, National Tank Truck
suggests the need to consider seriously non-federal solutions to claims
like those raised by the citizens of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, or Jacksonville, Arkansas. In light of the facts of National Tank Truck it becomes
difficult to appreciate the legalistic logic of a case like Nuclear Assurance
Corp., which locked out expressed local interests, giving little attention to
the substantive social choices involved.
The second ground used by the court in Nuclear Assurance Corp., to
quash local attempts to intervene in the direction of a federally-mandated
nuclear regulatory policy as it affected their communities, was the finding
that it was not required to address such concerns inasmuch as:
proponents and opponents of specific legislation or regulation may
make their positions heard by contacting the public officials involved in
84. 677 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1982).
85. Id. at 274-75. See also City of New York v. Ritter Transp., Inc., 515 F Supp. 663,
671 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 677 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The obvious reason for according deference to local safety regulation is that the local authorities are generally in the
best position to consider problems unique to their area and to tailor their rules
accordingly.").
86. 515 F Supp. at 665, aff'd sub nom., National Tank Truck Carners, Inc. v. City of
New York, 677 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1982).
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the legislative or administrative process, or by appearing at the public
hearings required during the administrative agency rule-making
process.87

The rhetoric here is striking on several levels. Most notably, the image of
government it conjures up is profoundly democratic. As indicated already, however, this image of democratic participation in the regulatory
process can easily be stifled by devices such as restrictive agency procedural requirements established by virtue of its rulemaking authority. In
addition, in the excerpt quoted above, the court ironically urges the airing of opinions to the relevant "public officials," when in NuclearAssurance Corp. it was in fact public officials, if not the "relevant" ones, who
brought suit on behalf of area residents. What this suggests is that the
administrative rhetoric of democratic participation may be profoundly

out of sync with the reality of administrative decisionmaking.
D. The Agency Knows Best: City of New York and the Refusal to
Recognize Local Concerns
After the suggestion that localities are not "affected interests" for the
purposes of this form of administrative regulation, the second group of
arguments typically used to defend inattention to municipal concern
about federal adminstrative matters is the retreat to explanations of
agency expertise. The flipside of this argument is also frequently invoked
to a similar end, pointing to the limitations of administrative power
under the delegation doctrine. The consequence is a tendency for courts
and agencies to retreat from discussion of policy concerns in a democratic fashion, hiding instead behind the veil of knowing better or, alternately, of incapacity to act.88
The controversial case of City of New York v. United States Dep't of
Transp.19 amply reveals the extent to which local interests are compromised by federal administrative prerogatives with this sort of argument.
The case involved a New York City suit to invalidate a Department of
Transportation (DOT) rule permitting transport of radioactive waste on
the City's highways. The City's proposed alternative was to have the
waste barged across the Long Island Sound on the grounds that this
mode of transport was both less expensive and safer. 90 Reversing the
earlier decision, the circuit court observed that "[t]he District Court's
construction of HMTA would place tremendous, if not insuperable, constraints on the [DOT's] rulemaking power.. [I]n the absence of explicit
statutory direction . courts should not strain to infer from vague statu87. Nuclear Assurance Corp., 588 F Supp. at 864.
88. For a theoretical investigation of the way these notions are developed, see Frug,
supra note 9, at 1297-1334. The examples offered here suggest that in some fashion the
expertise and formalist models are still very much alive, by contrast to Frug's speculation. Id. at 1297.
89. 539 F Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
90. Id. at 1246.
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tory language or legislative committee rhetoric a goal of maximizing a
particular public policy "91
From a municipality's point of view, however, this sort of reasoning
has the consequence of effectively locking the "public" out of the policy,
since administrative agencies end up determining public policy through
their bureaucratic, regulatory power. The reasons for this have been
touched upon already in the examples discussed in this Article, but the
problematic consequences of an intransigently federal administrative
doctrine in the face of local pressure is seen with special clarity in City of
New York. Not only were the City's reasons for barging compelling, but
the locale seeking to have its voice heard was also one of the nation's
most densely populated conurbations. Moreover, the court at least recognized the possible
force of arguments for local authorities to determine
92
alternative routes.
Nonetheless, the circuit court resolutely refused to endorse the district
court's finding of a significant role for nonfederal authorities under the
HMTA.93 Instead, it retreated to the suggestion that its hands were tied
in light of the "consolidated federal regulatory control" Congress gave
the DOT under the HMTA, concluding that the finding of a "requirement" to compare modes of transportation (e.g. barging versus trucking)
"would constitute a radical shift in regulatory policy with serious ramifications for the transportation industry "9'Possibly this is true. Yet the
court's reasoning reveals an anti-democratic rationale identifiable time
and again in federal administrative law doctrine. To be exact, the doctrine allows little room to ask questions of public choice. In this context,
an appropriate, possible question might be to wonder whether, for example, it is the transportation industry that regulatory policy should protect
at the possible expense of a city's population.9 5
The answer to such a query may be yes, but for the democratic theorist
it is discouraging that the municipality's voice is excluded on such formalistic grounds before an opportunity to discuss and consider other options was even entertained. This is especially true on the facts presented
in City of New York where there was no municipal disagreement with the
administrative bureaucracy's view that the spent fuel was going to con91. City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 740 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied., 463 U.S. 1055 (1984).
92. Id. at 738.
93. Id. at 752; but cf City of New York, 539 F Supp. at 1293 (where the lower court
offered a broad reading of the HMTA. "HMTA forbids DOT to choose the less safe of
two alternatives without any legitimate reason for doing so"); see also Ritter, 515 F
Supp. at 668 ("there is no requirement that a local government seek the approval of the
Secretary in advance of putting into effect local regulations about the transportion of
hazardous materials.") These readings of the HMTA suggest that the exclusion of local
interests need not occur as a routine matter.
94. City of New York, 715 F.2d at 741.
95. It is notable that the court's language seems to exclude "barging" from the
"transportation industry." In other words, "transportation" appears to mean
"trucking."
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tinue to be produced and had to be transported somewhere. That is, City
of New York provides an ideal example of an instance where political
interests need not have been compromised by accommodating the local
government position. In short, City of New York thus can be read to
stand for the proposition that federal administrative law doctrine is resolutely uninterested in the utility of local, democratic participation in the
administrative process.
In view of this situation, two further points are relevant. First, as mirrored in the City of New York court's concern for the fate of the transportation industry, the regulated industry is too often situated so as to be
unusually persuasive in shaping regulatory policy One commentator
explains:
DOT does not know the total number, size or location of firms that
transport hazardous materials, the kind of materials transported by
these carriers, or the volume of hazardous materials being shipped.
DOT also seriously underestimates the number of accidents that occur,
because it relies on voluntary reporting by the transportation
industry
96
and generally does not question the reports it receives.
That regulated industries, the interests typically held to be the parties
"affected" by regulation, are largely self-policing only further reinforces
the perception that local concerns are arbitrarily excluded from a valuable, needed role in the administrative process.
Second, in City of New York, as m Vermont Yankee and the Jersey
Central Power cases, scientific data on the possibilities of disasters revolving hazardous waste are taken as dispositive; the statistics are used to
quiet "human concerns." 9 7 Yet as Judge Oakes, dissenting in City of
New York declared, such quantifications are "absurd on their face . .
Extrapolation on the basis of limited time-place experience is notoriously
misleading; I note that the [statistics] were compiled before the near-catastrophic occurrence at9 8Three Mile Island with its sordid tale of human
and mechanical error.,

The mock assurances provided by such data all too easily become devices to forestall discussion of democratic priorities. In this instance, for
example, it renders moot the opportunity to allow the people of the City
of New York (or Cuyahoga County, Oio, or Ridgefield, Connecticut, or
Jacksonville, Arkansas) to assess for themselves the importance of competing priorities, to balance nuclear energy or other hazardous waste producmg technology against statistical improbabilities or against living
without the anxiety of a nuclear disaster. Instead, to use the Bowles
96. Marten, supra note 60, at 357; cf Stewart, supra note 7, at 1714-15.
97. Rainey, supra note 59, at 186; but cf City of New York, 715 F.2d at 746-51 (the
favorable discussion of the use of statistical evidence). An uncritical acceptance of statistics is sadly common in the legal literature on this subject. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer,
Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1833, 1835-45 (1978).
98. City of New York, 715 F.2d at 753-54 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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Group's phrase, an administrative "logic of profitability" prevails. 99
E. Preemption: An Agency's Ultimate DoctrnalDefense
In Judge Sofaer's reversed opiion in City of New York, he offered a
reading of the HMTA to the effect that "Congress provided for preemption on the reasonable ground that state and local regulations might
otherwise lessen the degree of safety provided by uniform federal rules,
or might interfere unreasonably with the unimpeded and safe flow of
commerce. ' ' °" Sofaer's analysis directs attention to the third general set
of arguments most often invoked against the routine inclusion of local
interests into administrative law, namely preemption doctrines.
In this, as in most areas of admimstrative law involving federal-local
disputes, preemption is the doctrinal trump card. In fact, in such confrontations, avatars of the doctrine appear with such frequency that it is
unnecessary to document their appearance at length. Even when courts
find no inconsistency With the intentions of federal regulation, preemption is the single issue which, at a minimum, must be addressed.i0l It is
the second half of Sofaer's analysis, the commercial concern, of preemption which, however, is given the greatest play in federal-local adminstrative disputes. In fact, Sofaer's ruling in City of New York is one of the
few decisions considered in this Article which balanced the issue of more
stringent local regulation against the concern to minimize burdens on
99. Anticipating the frequent rejoinder to this sort of argument that such "utopian"
views, in addition to being unworkable from a practical point of view, are also the luxury
of the educated and well-to-do, one need only attend to the circumstances of the citizenry
of Jacksonville, Arkansas. Despite the impoverishment of that community by comparison to national averages and the dependable employment provided for several generations
by the polluting pesticide producers, residents are not hesitating to mobilize against further contamination. See IN THESE TIMES, supra note 23, at 11. Contra Richard B. Stewart, PyramidsofSacrifice? Problemsof Federalism in MandatingState Implementation of
NationalEnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1221-23 (1977) (articulating standard
arguments against decentralized environmental regulation).
100. 539 F Supp. at 1253 (construing S. Rep. No. 1192, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9, 3738 (1974)). The HMTA preemption section is 49 U.S.C. § 1811. It is notoriously ambiguous, see generally Wallace, supra note 60.
101. See, e.g., Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'g,
628 F Supp. 623 (N.D. Ohio, 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 801 (1987) (Despite Congress'
failure explicitly to preempt local health and safety regulation when it authorized the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to regulate federal
worker and health and safety standards, City of Akron's "right to know" ordinance was
preempted by OSHA regulations. This ordinance required employers, inter alia:
[T]o provide information to their employees and designated representatives
about hazardous chemicals to which the employees may be exposed; and to
protect public health officials, and the public in general, by requiring employers
to provide information to the City's Fire Division and Health Department
about the hazardous chemicals manufactured, used or stored inside the workplace or stored as chemical waste.
801 F.2d at 825; see also New Hampshire v. Flynn, 751 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1984) (under 49
U.S.C. § 1811 a state is not prohibited from charging either a $25 annual fee or a $15
single-trip fee for the transportation of hazardous materials even when the total cost of
the trip is $25); see Stewart, supra note 99, at 1226-32.
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interstate commerce and came out endorsing the former. 0 2
As the nation becomes evermore crowded, congested and simultaneously, more technologically sophisticated, local demands challenging
commercial and jurisdictional interests asserted by federal administrative
authorities will increase. Certainly this is the trend indicated by the case
law discussed in this Article. It then becomes urgent to ask how and
where this local voice can expect to receive a hearing.
III.

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND THE REJECTION OF THE
LILLIPUTIAN VOICE

A.

Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein

Unfortunately, academic legal writing on administrative law reform
has not to date been the forum in which local alternatives have received
thorough consideration. Where local efforts are, typically, actively resisted by federal administrators, the treatment received by local initiative
in the administrative law literature is usually one of benign neglect. The
presence of this lacuna in legal writing on administrative reform is, moreover, something of a paradox. The federal administrative law system
lacks specific constitutional authority;10 3 in theory, there is no reason
that local administration could not be given a comparable delegation of
authority
Arguably, dioxin-poisoned residents of Jacksonville, Arkansas should
be able just as easily to choose administrative support and redress from
decentralized administrative law units as from federal E.P.A. authorities.
Moreover, the fact that administrative agencies have been delegated
wide-ranging power remains of concern (if it is not deeply troubling) to
most administrative law scholars." Despite this concern, curiously, local government options are scarcely mentioned by legal scholars.
Stewart is the most eloquent academic spokesman for the seldom contested view that agency power must be curtailed, or at least integrated
more fully into the federal structure. To this end, he wishes to see the
source and limits of agency authority clearly identified.10 5 This is not to
say that Stewart and Sunstem, his sometime collaborator, insist upon
102. The cases considered here which successfully argued this position, carefully distinguished the local interests on extremely narrow grounds. See supra note 98 and ac-

companying text. The more typical decision is to overturn the safety concern in favor of
ensuring commerce. See, e.g., National Tank Truck Carners, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819
(Ist Cir. 1979).
103. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 7, at 1672; Stewart & Sunstem, supra note 68, at
1212.
104. See, e.g., the variety of opinions offered on the subject in the symposium collected
in 72 VA. L. REV. (1986).
105. See supra notes 7, 66, 68 and 99; see also Richard B. Stewart, The Discontentsof
Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REv 655
(1985); cf William H. Clune, Unreasonablenessand Alienation in the Continuing Relationships of Welfare State Bureaucracy, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 707 (1985); Ronald A. Cass,
Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV 363 (1986).
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what they label "the formalist thesis," meaning the view that "federal
courts must have some textual warrant, constitutional or statutory, for
adding new remedies to administrative systems."1 6 Indeed, they ardently advocate an interventiomst judiciary, eager to identify new solutions for administrative reform. In addition, they promote the use, and
urge the development, of non-judicial controls to remedy the problems of
an administrative law system seriously requirmg reform."17
For some time, Stewart has devoted himself with considerable ingenuity to make sense of and suggest a wide range of corrective measures.
Importantly, he has consistently proceeded in this task with the willingness to admit a "dense complexity" in trying to assess the place and role
of the American system of administrative law 108 Thus, democratic reformers of the admnistrative law system find themselves, paradoxically,
in agreement with Stewart. That is, like Stewart, the democratic reformer emphasizes the need for flexibility in seeking administrative reform through novel assignments of regulatory authority But the
democratic reformer looks for that flexibility and the object of delegation
at a grass roots level, working from the bottom up. At a theoretical level,
these are possibilities scarcely entertained by Stewart, or, for that matter,
in most mainstream writing on the reform of admimstrative law.
Instead, Stewart has, over nearly two decades, proposed a number of
radical measures for regulatory reform. These have ranged from an exploration of the possible forms of expanded interest group representation,' 0 9 such as popular election of agency bureaucrats or the selection of
administrators by interest groups,11° to a system of government-issued
permits (in the context of environmental regulation) which could be
traded freely among polluters in an area in order to reduce the burden on
" '
the regulatory authority and promote free market choices. 11
This free market option is characteristic of Stewart's conception of decentralization. In 1975, he explored the virtues of a libertarian form of
106. Stewart & Sunstem, supra note 68, at 1199; cf Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 573, 620 (1984). The traditional view of agency integrity and self-autonomy within
the limits of its congressionally delegated authority can be seen in Clark Byse, Vermont
Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91
HARV L. REv 1823, 1826 (1978) ("[I]t is the responsibility of the agency, not the reviewing court, to decide how the agency shall conduct its business and allocate its
resources.").
107. Stewart & Sunstem, supra note 68, at 1319; cf Cass R. Sunstem, Factions,SelfInterest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271 (1986). A less
critical view of an active, interventionist judiciary working in support of agency decisions
as long as they are "reasonable" is articulated by Breyer, supra note 97.
108. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1813.
109. Id. at 1805-06.
110. Id. at 1790-97.
111. Stewart, supra note 105, at 682-85. Although environmental policy is a particular
concern of Stewart's, his use of the example seems to suggest that in his view free market
solutions such as that described above could be implemented throughout the regulatory
system.
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deregulation, 112 and in 1986 offered a decentralized alternative in the
form of regulatory "delegalization," both in the courts and within the
administrative apparatus itself. He further reflected that "devolving regulatory decisions to state and local admimstrators might reduce the
number of parties, simplify the issues, and thereby promote negotiated
agreements." Stewart surmised nonetheless that "this alternative is
likely to increase industry bargaining power substantially because the resources of state and local regulators and of local advocacy groups are
often inferior to those of industry Also, industry might deter state and
local administrators from adopting stringent standards by threatening to
'exit' to another jurisdiction." '113 In view of the appealing but for him
unrealistically utopian route of regulatory delegalization, Stewart concluded with an endorsement of "economic-based incentive systems" like
his voucher plan.114
From the perspective of the local admimstrative reformer, Stewart's
emphasis on economic paths to decentralized power is striking because it
avoids entirely the possibility of local government involvement in the administrative process. Tis is not, it should be stressed, because Stewart is
in any way anti-democratic. 1 5 With Sunstem, he has gone to great
lengths, in fact, to celebrate the participatory effects possible with an expansion of private remedies in admimstrative matters." 6 A careful reading of Stewart's work suggests that, as with a majority of administrative
law scholars, local government exists for him not as an option for enriching civic life through administrative law, but as an impediment to its
successful implementation. Thus, for instance, at least with regard to
national environmental policy,
[t]he success of federal programs has been gravely compromised by
112. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1689-93.
113. Stewart, supra note 105, at 683. Stewart provides no empirical evidence in support of his claim that industry bargaining power would be greater at a local level, citing
only an article of his own. The referenced pages in that article point, moreover, to the
relative cost/benefit advantages of environmental public interest litigation, and not to
local government initiative in environmental matters. Furthermore, the cases discussed
in this Article can be read as richly illustrative of the proposition that in an evermore
densely populated and technology-dependent society, municipalities are forced to
broaden their view beyond purely economic factors, balancing health and safety requirements, for example, against industrial interests. City of New York and the Jersey Central
Power cases suggest an increasing awareness of the imperative to make such compromises; even then, at a federal level, local interests were ultimately overturned to promote interstate commercial concerns. As for the suggestion of the danger of "exit," this
seems something of a perfunctory, straw man argument. At least the Jacksonville, Arkansas dioxin example indicates that municipalities may choose non-economic interests
even when they are not prosperous. The claim may be further disingenuous in a crowded
world: utilities, for example, cannot simply "exit" when they find a regulatory environment too rigid.
114. Id. at 683-85.
115. But see, Stewart & Sunstem, supra note 68, at 1277 n.353.
116. See generally, id. at 1246-1316. For a specific instance of what they have in mind,
see id. at 1279; cf Stewart, supra note 7, at 1770-76 (expessing Stewart's earlier concern
for unorganized or poorly organized interests).
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dependence upon state and local governments, whose generally poor
record m controlling environmental deterioration triggered the imtial
resort to federal legislation, and whose subsequent performance in the
context of federal programs has in many instances remained
inadequate. 117
For Stewart, important measures of the inadequacy of local programs are
local resistance to federal demands and linted federal enforcement resources. l is In short, Stewart evidences a deep suspicion of the role of
local interests in being able to contribute to the successful search for a
collective goal like a national clean air policy.
It would require empirical study properly to respond to Stewart's arguments about local responses to federal environmental policy This discussion can only hope, therefore, to document and question his
assumption of local government incapacity. This is an assumption evident throughout his writing. Over a decade ago, Stewart observed "until
the improbable arrival of the day of radical transformation in the nature
of bureaucracy, one must probably rely upon outside, general-purpose
institutions to check agencies' tunnel vision and ensure that important
affected interests are not totally ignored."' ' 9 More recently, Stewart and
Sunstem analyzed the possibilities for an elaborate system of judicial restraints on administrative power, relying upon an appreciation by courts
12
of the "background understandings" of "basic government functions." 0
These "background understandings" are located by Stewart and Sunstem
in three conceptions of government, specifically the ideals of entitlement,
production and public values.2' By identifying these three conceptions,
Stewart and Sunstem strive broadly to make the businesses of administration and regulation more accessible to all sectors of our society
What emerges from this summary is that Stewart and Sunstem's motives are democratic; this makes their inattention to participatory local
government solutions all the more surprising. For example, rather than
crafting ingenious (if wholly theoretical) admimstrative reform solutions,
such as outside, general-purpose institutions or expanded judicial activism requiring a high degree of individual sophistication from every decisionmaker, Stewart and Sunstem might have advocated the use of
existing, organized local efforts as a means to restrain federal administrative dominance. Would it not be simpler to release the pent-up energies
of local governments and citizens' groups rather than to rely upon
vaguely articulated notions of general, all-purpose checks?
Additionally, it is worth asking not only what can be done to correct
117. Stewart, supra note 99, at 1196.
118. Id. at 1203-04 (on EPA efforts to secure implementation of federal controls on
motor vehicle use).
119. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1808.
120. Stewart & Sunstem, supra note 68, at 1231.
121. For Stewart and Sunstem, these notions are equally compelling. My fundamental
difference of approach from them begins at this point with a belief that the entitlement
and production conceptions are subordinate to their conception of public values.
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the flaws of the traditional model of administrative agencies in order to
improve regulatory performance, but also to ask why that model has
been unsatisfactory. For instance, Stewart recognizes the paradox of
vague agency charters and unclear statutory language upon which agencies rely in executing their duties "22 and notes the complex problems
raised by influence over agencies by industry representatives. 123 But in
acknowledging these issues, he does not question the basic premises of
federal administrative law A central proposition advanced in this Article has been the suggestion that structural problems like these may
largely be the result of ineptly distributed authority At minimum, it
seems worthwhile to consider increased democratic participation in the
control of the regulatory process. As it stands, the peculiar dissatisfaction expressed by Stewart and Sunstein as to the current shape of federal
administration is typical of academic legal theorists. On the one hand,
they reason that "[p]rivate lawsuits are poor forums for reconciling the
various social norms involved in regulatory programs." Yet on the
other, while they recognize "the limitations of courts and of the forms of
actions they create[,]" they "conclude that courts have authority to create" various private rights in admimstrative matters. Stewart and Sunstein further view these expanded private rights "as legitimate and useful
corrections for deficient admiustrative performance."1 24 Thus, Stewart
and Sunstem show a remarkable acquiescence to the notion of a uniform
administrative law system (if not a uniform theory of administrative law)
and a willingness to patch up the current arrangement as need be so long
as its essentially federal character can be preserved.
To plead for the systematic integration of local interests into administrative lawmaking, by contrast, is only to endorse one aspect of Stewart's
"dense complexity" and the probable unavailability of a unitary theory of
administrative law 125 However, it is characteristic of administrative law
scholarship to seek improved regulatory performance with uniform theories because agency power is perceived to be insufficiently constrained. 126
It is worth examining the variety of these theories, noting, once again,
their marked disregard of local solutions.
B.

Other Administrative Law Scholars

Theories similar to Stewart and Sunstein's notions of judicial flexibility
of response are especially popular.27 Judicial flexibility with respect to
122. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1676-77. Vagueness has been recognized as a feature of
the HMTA. See Wallace, supra note 60, at 657-58; See National Tank Truck Carriers,
Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 822 (1st Cir. 1979).
123. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1714-15.
124. Stewart & Sunstem, supra note 68, at 1320-21.
125. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1813.
126. See Cass, supra note 105.
127. See James V DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: JudicialReview in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REv 399, 424 (1986). DeLong's "broad vision of administrative
behavior" recognizes that agencies may need to take municipal concerns into accourit but
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administrative law has been urged as a means to secure a number of ends,
from the expansion of private remedies under state common law 2 ' to "a
lesser degree of judicial deference to federal agency action." 1 29 Looking
to Congress, other commentators favor increased legislative control of
agencies, 30 while still others would prefer to see the agencies themselves
employ a "synoptic paradigm of decisionmaking" drawing upon several
policymakmg models, averring that on balance the agencies are "best
equipped to make" public policy choices."' Still other commentators
put absolute faith in neither the agencies nor the courts in an effort "to
reemphasize the political, discretionary, incremental nature of rulemaking" 132 or resort to the conclusion that administrative law reflects multiple competing, normative traditions in our liberal33 legal-political order
which are inevitably in tension with one another.1
Some administrative law theorists favor more explicitly participatory
reforms.13 1 Joel F. Handler uses the example of "cooperative decisionmaking" in the Madison, Wisconsin public schools where parents work
with the schools in shaping special education policy. 35 For Handler,
this is an undertaking to insure open recognition of alternative choices,
or, as he puts it, "communicative conflict rather than adversarialconflict."'1 6 Another commentator claims a "long tradition of federal deference to more limited regulations unless they discriminate against outside
fails to broach the possibility of local control as an element of his "broad vision." Id. at
433.
128. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and PrivateLegal Remedies
for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 171-223 (1985).
129. Rainey, supra note 60, at 188 (the quoted section continues: "with respect to the
volatile and unpredictable areas of hazardous waste transportation."); cf DeLong, supra
note 127, at 445 ("The courts are and will remain the primary institutions for controlling
agency behavior, but they are not the only ones. Congress, the President and the agencies
themselves all play important roles in guaranteeing that agency performance conform to
society's expectations.").
130. E.g., Wesley A. Magat and Christopher H. Schroeder, Administrative ProcessReform in a DiscretionaryAge: The Role of Social Consequences, 1984 DUKE L.J. 301
(1984).
131. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REV 393, 433 (1981). Diver wants to see the courts do the "finetuning" of these policy
choices.
132. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past,Present,Future, 72 VA. L. REv 447, 491 and passim
(1986). See generally, id. for an argument for the overhaul of established rulemaking
procedures in order to achieve greater predictability in light of the political character of
administrative processes.
133. Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The
ContemporaryDebate, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 385 (1984).
134. Id. at 425-31. Sargentich celebrates the virtues of participatory democracy but
concludes that "institutional realities" prevent realization of this goal.
135. Joel F Handler, ContinuingRelationships and the Administrative Process: Social
Welfare, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 687 (1985). Handler's choice of example is criticized as
unrepresentative by Komesar, supra note 68, at 755-57.
136. Id. at 696 (emphasis in original).
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industries or produce no safety benefits." 13' 7
Another group of theorists imagine more radical alternatives. Troubled by the phenomenon of unaccountable administrative bureaucracies,
Robert B. Reich approvingly cites "the potential for public administrators to enhance social learmng" demonstrated by the case of Asarco, in
which a job-producing but polluting arsenic manufacturer in the Tacoma, Washington area faced the alternative of closing if forced to comply with EPA regulations. 38 In a dramatic gesture, the then EPA
Admimistrator, William Ruckelshaus, flew to Tacoma in the summer of
public "workshops" in search of a local re1983 and conducted three
1 39
sponse to tlus dilemma.
In a particularly novel, imaginative effort to answer the democratic
concerns of reformers advocating decentralization, Clune hypothesizes
the shape of a new economic democracy, distinguished by the creation of
a National House of Commons composed of members elected by lower
income, non-managerial persons representing "chapters of universal labor and welfare unions" and similar innovations." Clune's proposals
are unquestionably more in the spirit of the reforms advocated by the
Bowles Group than any others examined here. Yet it is consistently
striking that these and similar proposals are, in the final analysis, thoroughly federal solutions. To quote Reich: "[a] critical challenge for the
public administrator responsible for federal regulation will be to foster
social learning at the national level where standard-making must ultimately take place. Local experiences like the Tacoma experiment, however, can be integral, if not essential, to national civic discovery "14
This Article has endeavored to evaluate why Stewart and Sunstein and
other administrative law scholars routinely conclude that federal solutions to administrative reform need not make local experience essential as
well as integral. The Article has undertaken to demonstrate the neglect
of a local voice m American administrative law and also to document
some of the sources of that neglect. The transport of hazardous waste
examples indicate that standard setting may fruitfully take place at the
local level, with local government initiatives fostering social learning,
playing both an integral and an essential role in the process of "civic
discovery," national and otherwise.
Returning to the question that opened this discussion, how exactly is
this "civic discovery" of increased democratic participation in the administrative process to proceed? Where does the reshaping the contours of
federal administrative law begin? Stated otherwise, by what means can
137. Wallace, supra note 60, at 656. Despite this statement, the author does not name
a case which conclusively demonstrates his point.
138. Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation:An Interpretive
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1632-37 (1985).
139. Id. at 1634. Reich adds that the Asarco case ended in an anticlimactic fashion.
140. Clune, supra note 105, at 727; see generally id. at 723-35 for full exposition of his
proposals.
141. Reich, supra note 138, at 1638.
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society force discussion of democratic choices, an option generally precluded to localities by regulatory and judicial interventions? The facts of
City of New York again provide an informative point of departure. The
New York City health regulation which gave rise to the controversy was
adopted on January 15, 1976. Thereafter, the Brookhaven National Laboratories was compelled to ship spent nuclear fuel from Long Island
across the Long Island Sound to New London, Connecticut. 142 On August 21, 1978, however, New London passed an ordinance banning the
transport of spent fuel from Brookhaven through its borders. Although
the New London ordinance was subsequently repealed by a Connecticut
statute,143 the New London response is a model of the rich potential for
inter-local decisionmaking which localities could consistently contribute
to American public life.
This remarkable inter-local instance of the power of municipalities to
bond together and shape a consensus on larger policy concerns, furthermore, promises to achieve more truly democratic results than a highly
self-conscious court can be expected to provide in staving off "the potentially devastating consequences of narrowminded incremental decisions,"
as Diver would have it. Similarly, the New York-New London example
suggests the possibility for a higher valuation of democratic choice than
could be accomplished by Stewart and Sunstem's judges, eagerly analyzing the "background understandings" in each case. More explicit,
preplanned inter-local cooperation on matters of civic concern would
presumably yield even broader democratic results than seen in the New
York-New London illustration.
The instance of City of Philadelphiav. New Jersey 14 evidences further
possibilities for cross-local cooperation. In that case, Philadelphia and
other plaintiffs challenged a New Jersey statute closing its borders to
State," with
waste "which originated or was collected outside the
certain narrow exceptions.1 45 New Jersey apparently aimed thereby to
safeguard the health and safety of its residents, and to prevent New
Jersey from becoming a landfill dump for all other states. 146 In so doing,
New Jersey "[i]mmediately affected . the operators of private landfills
in New Jersey, and several cities in other States that had agreements with
these operators for waste disposal."1 47 Although the New Jersey
Supreme Court endorsed this action as a legitimate case in which to exclude the primacy of Commerce Clause considerations, the United States
Supreme Court firmly rejected that court's rationale.148 In terms of the
142. 539 F Supp. at 1243-44.
143. Id. at 1244 n.2.

144. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
145. Id. at
146. Id. at
147. Id. at
148. Id. at

618.
620-23.
619.
628.
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argument advanced in this Article, the Supreme Court erred in viewing
New Jersey's statute as a purely defensive, isolating measure.
IV

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

A. Reform Possibilities
In order to further the cause of a decentralized jurisprudence of administrative law, the Supreme Court might have opted to evaluate New
Jersey's statute as offensive, as an act designed to bring to a head public
discussion of an issue of pressing national concern. First, this would
agree with then Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in City of Philadelphia,
who asserted that:
The physical fact of life that New Jersey must somehow dispose of its
own noxious items does not mean that it must serve as a depository for
those of every other State. Similarly, New Jersey should be free under
our past precedents to prohibit the importation of solid waste because
of the health and safety problems that such waste poses to its citizens.
The fact that New Jersey continues to, and indeed must continue to,
dispose of its own solid waste does not mean that New Jersey may not
prohibit the importation of even more solid waste into the State.149

The views articulated in this Article presume the potential for securing
even more than the degree of local autonomy Rehnquist would permit.
Instead, and second, it is worth speculating on the possible effects of an
administrative law jurisprudence which encouraged and even celebrated
the example of New Jersey passing a statute like this one. This would be
a jurisprudence which would allow a state to make such a choice as an
explicit means to wait and see how others will respond, thereby slowly to
formulate new national solutions to problems like waste transport and
disposal on an incremental, locality-by-locality basis. To be sure, there
would be a definite place for federal monitormg of such a process. It is
quite possible, for example, that local statutes could be used to effect
economic protectionism, racially discriminatory housing patterns or any
number of undesirable results if left unchecked. But it is also true that
democratic participation in governing is a value which deserves more
than lip service and has been severely undermined by the regulatory values of the administrative bureaucracy
City of New York, City of Philadelphiaand the other cases considered
here demonstrably support the usefulness of introducing notions of decentralized administrative law But what forms would this revised jurisprudence of administrative procedure take? It is possible to imagine
several possibilities.
149. Id. at 632 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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1. A Revised Constitutional Jurisprudence in Regulatory Matters
a. Commerce Clause

As demonstrated in City of Philadelphia and elsewhere, Commerce
Clause attacks on local efforts at self-government typically act as perfunctory, absolute bars to democratic participation. It is not enough to
respond that citizens can participate in the rulemaking process if and
when federal agency representatives hold hearings in their locality. The
vision of democratic participation encouraged here conceives of citizen
involvement in the long term, on a continuing basis. A revised approach
to Commerce Clause and other preemption claims in the administrative
law context would encourage courts mediating issues of pressing local
concern to expand the exceptions to doctrines favoring national commercial, purely economic interests.' 5 °
b. Other Constitutional Grounds
Local challenges to federal administrative control would do well to
press increasingly for resolution of claims under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, demanding the full articulation of these largely neglected
amendments.' 5 1 Similarly, a reworking of local interests in terms of the
Eleventh Amendment may be in order. Dissenting in Ex Parte Young,
Justice Harlan noted the need to "assume - a decent respect for the
States requires us to assume - that the state courts will enforce every
right secured by the Constitution." '52 Harlan's admonition merits reevaluation and application not only to state courts but to all levels of
local government. His words urge in particular a fresh examination of
the chimerical rhetoric of consistency and uniformity in a legal system
which derives its ultimate authority from a deliberately terse document.
2.

A General Tolerance for Local Experiment

A revised administrative law jurisprudence would begin to think of
local regulatory measures as experiments, viewing localities as laboratories for tests in democratic government. This is again to question the
ability to achieve consistency and uniformity in administration; it is also
to seek democratic intervention in the regulatory process. For example:
a. Action/reaction
As seen in City of New York, this revised jurisprudence would permit a
local decision to stand and wait for the regulatory reaction by affected
150. Although the Court in City of Philadelphia rejected New Jersey's argument, certain Commerce Clause cases are precedents for such interpretation. See id. at 622, (referring to Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888)).

151. That this will not be an easy task is demonstrated by excerpts of Justice Brennan's

majority opinion in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988); but see id. at
530 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

152. 209 U.S. 123, 176 (1908).
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localities. My assumption is that n short order a pattern of decision
would emerge permitting a more truly consensual determination of the
preferable policy to implement.
b.

Cross-local Coordination

Presumably, the action/reaction model outlined above could quickly
lead to overt policy coordination between several localities. Thus, in City
of New York, New York could conceivably have passed its ordinance and
then explicitly appealed to New London and other nearby localities probably affected by the ordinance (or it might not pass the law at all, and
simply appeal for regional action). This might be to seek notice and
comment from all immediately concerned. A clear problem with this
particular option would be that of the unequal bargaining positions of the
parties. Yet this criticism presents no convincing argument against the
systematic implementation of such an approach. Rather, it points to the
proper use of federal, state, or extra-regional legal and administrative
checks on decisions by decentralized administrative units. It may be that
such a model poses problems for more isolated and less populous, or
poorer, communities. Small or poor communities might be neglected,
with the "ripple effect" of the cross-local coordination envisioned here
touching them last of all. This would again present a moment where
federal administrative intervention would be appropriate.
This model of cross-local coordination further suggests that "crosslocal" need not be narrowly defined. Localities could initially define
their shared interests and publicly act upon them at a national level
through extant structures like the National League of Cities and national
mayors and governors conferences. For instance, local elected officials
could make it a practice to go to such conferences with instructions from
their electorate (e.g., given to them through referenda) and invite similar
actions from other localities. Similar views could thus gain strength by
association.
c. Nonviolent Municipal Civil Disobedience
At first glance, the suggestion that a municipality engage in civil disobedience seems an impossibility, or, at best, a contradiction in terms.
However, the enfeeblement of localities in their attempts at self-regulation justifies such an approach. Imagine the governor of New Jersey,
acting in furtherance of the state statute prohibiting foreign waste transport and disposal, in collaboration with mayors and city councils across
the state, instructing state employees and other citizens involved in landfill projects not to participate in handling out of state wastes. This would
be not only a powerful political symbol; it would also seriously burden
interstate commerce as citizens from out of state bore disposal costs
under aggravating conditions of nonviolent noncooperation. Ideally, a
prolonged national reevaluation of such policies (and the technologies
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necessitating them) would result. 153
Behind all of these suggestions is the assumption that we can only benefit from forcing democratic discussion of crucial issues by making the
constituent members of our democracy its central, ammating force. This
would correct the irony, noted by Stewart, whereby the Founders would
to hear the courtroom touted as the
find themselves "bewildered
cockpit of democracy" as the judiciary labors to check administrative
agency oversights.' 54 If this is to happen, however, issues of import cannot consistently be brushed aside when they involve local initiatives.
Moreover, sustained attention to local democratic efforts may eventually
affect a change in our perceptions of local boundaries. It may be that the
frequent artificiality of state and local lines should be freely redrawn in
order better to facilitate shared but shifting interests. This is to remark,
for example, on the peculiarity of Philadelphia suing New Jersey, when
the southern half of New Jersey is closely tied to the Philadelphia area.
Philadelphia's interests may! lie with Camden more than Bethlehem in
many instances (and this may change again in a generation or two). It is
worth asking how an antagonistic relationship could be abandoned when
possibilities exist for shaping cooperative relations.
As noted already, such decentralizing reforms of the regulatory system
will present obstacles. Arguably, the problems of demagoguery and insular, local prejudices are greater at the local than at the national level,
where increased exposure dilutes the impact of political extremists. But
while the recognition of these and similar concerns suggests the role for
federal administrators in a revised, more decentralized system of regulation, they do not militate against it. The false necessity of agency expertise, impartiality, fairness or ability uniformly to enforce regulations
allows uncritical endorsement of an administrative status quo inhibiting
democratic engagement m government.
CONCLUSION

It must again be stressed that these suggestions should not be msunderstood as endorsing a unitary theory of local control over administration. On the contrary, the dangers of unbridled local power could
threaten social gains made in other fields, such as the preservation of
wetlands and coastal areas 5 and in providing public housing irrespective of race. 156 What is suggested here is, rather, that the regular inclusion of local interests in administrative law could only help advance the
identification of optimal civic responses to policy decisions. The argu153. This would be quite unlike the efforts by southern officials to prevent racial integration during the civil rights movement by virtue of its nonviolent character.
154. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1761 n.437.
155. Stewart, supra note 99, at 1202.
156. Allen R. Gold, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1988, at A10 (federal order for Boston
Housing Authority to integrate mostly white projects causes fear of renewed racial
violence).
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ment set forth here seeks not to invalidate the substantial gains marked
in federal regulation of matters such as employment discrniination and
occupational safety but rather to build upon them by enriching opportunities for democratic choice.
In lieu of nationwide acceptance of the kind of inter-local action briefly
evidenced in the circumstances surrounding the City of New York litigation, there are stopgap measures which local governments could use to
secure their positions against federal administrative dominance. With regard to transport of hazardous substances, states or municipalities could
pass strict liability laws, for which there is no current provision in the
HMTA,157 or rulemaking procedures could be formally expanded to recogrnze the special interests of local authorities. 158 But these and similar
measures would be short-term solutions only, and probably, would
quickly be overturned by the clever arguments of well-paid lawyers.
What is needed, therefore, is a thorough rethinking of the character of
our administrative law system and m particular, resolution of the issue of
where best to locate its power. At present, one possibility raised by the
legal materials reviewed in this Article is that the federal adminstrative
structure and the branches of government which serve to validate its
power are afraid of the unknown consequences of participatory democracy In a discussion of Vermont Yankee, Diver's comments are
apposite:
More fundamentally, Vermont Yankee expresses the Court's unease,
not with lower court efforts to rationalize policymaaking, but with their
attempts to democratize it in ways incompatible with the synoptic paradigm
It was th[e] emphasis that "public concern
be quieted"
that seems to have troubled the Supreme Court most deeply. The
Court's quarrel is thus not with synoptic analysis, but rather with one
of its most consistent camp followers: broadened public
participation. 159
If this is indeed the case, it is, to say the least, regrettable. To quote
Judge Bazelon again, the import of issues like those involved in Vermont
Yankee extends beyond the present, involving "basic philosophical issues
concerning man's ability to make commitments which will require stable
social structures for unprecedented periods."1 60
Of course, unlike hazardous technologies and the wastes they produce,
not all public issues and policy concerns require analysis in terms of "unprecedented periods." But Bazelon's recognition cautions us to always
consider long-term changes in the character of our social institutions. As
157. Marten, supra note 60, at 376.
158. Wallace, supra note 60, at 662; cf.the revision of the appropriation section of the
HMTA at 49 U.S.C. § 1812(l)(1984), which includes federal evaluation of programs
properly to train federal, state and local agencies and private organizations in the correct
handling of hazardous substances. The rhetoric of cooperation between several levels of
government and the citizenry is at least encouraging.
159. Diver, supra note 131, at 423 (footnotes omitted).
160. NRDC v. USNEC, 547 F.2d at 652.
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documented in the transport of hazardous substances cases, society may
already act on this advice and start to effect actual democratic decisions
through decentralized administration, reflecting more open public recognition of "the significance of choice" (in Piore and Sabel's apt phrase)
and simultaneously arrive at more satisfactory solutions to difficult
issues.
The historian Robert Frykenberg once documented the vicissitudes of
British Imperial authorities in India during the nineteenth century as
they struggled to implement a Western-style court system. 16 1 While the
British successfully constructed a Western-style legal apparatus,
Frykenberg explains, there remained considerable discontinuity in the
administration of Indian law, by virtue of the continued preference at a
local level for time-honored village traditions of the administration of
justice. Frykenberg thus documents how "[m]uch more like Gulliver
than like Leviathan, the district administration became tied down, silently, by one tiny strand after another. A slumbering central authority
' 162
would be pegged to earth by countless threads of local influence."
Paradoxically, in America today, where we have the power to direct the
shape of our legal structures by contrast to the experience of traditional
India under a colonizing power, the citizenry finds itself surprisingly
powerless in the face of centralized administrative legal authority It is
time, therefore, that American localities be allowed to help correct this
paradox. We need to begin to let local Lilliputians do their part to tie the
administrative Gulliver down.
161. ROBERT ERIC FRYKENBERG, LAND CONTROL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN INDIAN HISTORY (1979).

162. Id. at 264.

